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					ABSTRACT	TAYLOR	THRASHER:	Crime	and	the	Business	Cycle	in	Mississippi	(Under	the	direction	of	Dr.	Thomas	Garrett)			 This	thesis	examines	the	relationship	between	crime	and	the	business	cycle	in	 Mississippi.	 Working	 with	 a	 theoretical	 model	 of	 the	 individual’s	 decision	 to	commit	a	 crime,	 I	 show	 that	 an	 increase	 in	 legal	 income	decreases	an	 individual’s	propensity	 to	 commit	 crime.	 I	 then	 use	 regressions	 to	 estimate	 the	 long-run	 and	short-run	 income	 elasticities	 of	 violent	 crime,	 burglary,	 larceny,	 and	 vehicle	 theft.	The	long-run	empirical	model	shows	how	income	growth	effects	crime	growth,	and	the	 short-run	 empirical	 model	 shows	 how	 income	 variability	 effects	 crime	variability.	In	the	long	run,	I	find	that	as	income	increases	(decreases),	both	burglary	and	 larceny	 decrease	 (increase).	 In	 the	 short	 run,	 larceny	 again	 decreases	(increases)	 as	 income	 increases	 (decreases),	 and	 burglary	 rises	 during	 years	 for	which	 there	 are	 recessions.	 I	 find	 no	 long-run	 or	 short-run	 relationship	 between	violent	crime	or	vehicle	theft	and	the	business	cycle.							
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Chapter	I:	Introduction	Each	 year,	 national,	 state,	 and	 local	 governments	 and	 individual	 citizens	allocate	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	 their	 resources	 to	 crime	 prevention.	 In	 2015,	total	 state	 and	 local	 government	 spending	 on	police	 and	 corrections	 totaled	 $181	billion	in	the	United	States,	which	accounted	for	about	6	percent	of	all	spending	by	state	 and	 local	 governments.1	In	 particular,	 the	 state	 of	 Mississippi	 and	 local	governments	spent	$1,229,560,000	on	police	protection	and	corrections	in	2015.2	In	addition,	 many	 crimes	 generate	 costs	 which	 governments	 are,	 at	 least	 partially,	expected	to	cover,	such	as	the	cost	of	courtroom	procedures.	Crime	also	generates	social	costs,	such	as	the	mental	and	emotional	costs	that	crime	inflicts	on	its	victims.	Thus,	from	both	financial	and	social	perspectives,	information	on	crime	trends	and	research	into	the	determinants	of	crime	and	crime	prevention	are	of	importance	for	governments	and	their	constituents.		Information	 collected	 from	 the	 FBI’s	 Uniform	 Crime	 Reporting	 (UCR)	database	 for	 the	 period	 of	 1969-2015	 indicates	 that	 national	 violent	 crime	(encompassing	 murder,	 rape,	 robbery,	 and	 assault)	 per	 capita	 increased	 steadily	until	 the	early	1990’s	 (hitting	an	all-time	high	of	approximately	7.6	violent	crimes	per	1,000	people),	at	which	point	it	began	declining.	The	rate	has	remained	below	4	
																																																								1	https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/police-and-corrections-expenditures		2	US	Bureau	of	the	Census,	Survey	of	State	and	Local	Government	Finance,	2015	
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violent	 crimes	 per	 1,000	 people	 since	 2011.	 National	 larceny	 rates	 also	 peaked	around	1991	at	about	32.1	larcenies	per	1,000	people	and	decreased	from	then	on,	hitting	a	low	of	17.8	per	1,000	in	2015.	Similarly,	vehicle	theft	per	capita	reached	a	high	in	1991,	amounting	to	about	6.6	per	1,000	people,	and	has	generally	decreased	for	the	following	two	and	a	half	decades.	The	rate	stood	at	2.2	per	1,000	people	in	2015.	 Burglary	 per	 capita	 in	 the	 U.S.	 began	 declining	more	 than	 a	 decade	 earlier	than	 violent	 crime,	 larceny,	 and	 vehicle	 theft.	 The	 rate	 reached	 a	 maximum	 of	approximately	 16.7	 burglaries	 per	 1,000	 people	 in	 1980	 and	 has,	 with	 few	exceptions,	 decreased	 or	 remained	 constant	 since	 then,	 ultimately	 achieving	 its	lowest	value	(about	4.9	burglaries	per	1,000	people)	in	2015.		The	trends	of	per	capita	rates	of	violent	crime,	burglary,	larceny,	and	vehicle	theft	in	Mississippi	from	1969	to	2015	roughly	resemble	those	of	national	crime	rate	trends.	Violent	crime	per	capita	 in	Mississippi	reached	a	sharp	peak	(almost	5	per	1,000	people	per	year)	in	the	mid-1990’s.	Over	the	past	twenty	years,	violent	crime	has	fallen	considerably,	but	it	continues	to	hover	around	a	rate	of	2.6	violent	crimes	per	 1,000	 people	 per	 year.	 Vehicle	 theft	 per	 capita	 in	 Mississippi	 experienced	 a	similar	trajectory:	it	rose	quickly	to	its	maximum	(about	4.8	per	1,000)	in	the	1990’s	but	 has	 since	 declined.	 Burglary	 per	 capita	 also	 reached	 its	 peak	 in	 the	 1990’s,	although	it	did	so	at	a	much	slower	rate	than	did	vehicle	theft	or	violent	crime.	Its	decline	since	the	1990’s	has	persisted	at	a	slower	rate	than	those	of	vehicle	theft	and	violent	crime	as	well.	Larceny	per	capita	has	followed	a	similar	pattern	as	burglary,	but	larceny	exhibited	a	slight	uptick	in	the	past	couple	of	years.	In	2015,	there	were	
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about	 1.4	 vehicle	 thefts,	 8.3	 burglaries,	 and	 18.6	 larcenies	 per	 1,000	 people	 in	Mississippi.		In	 typical	 economic	 models	 of	 individual	 behavior,	 individuals	 determine	whether	or	not	to	perform	an	action	(e.g.,	purchase	a	good,	move	locations,	take	the	bus,	etc.)	based	on	their	internal	cost-benefit	analysis.	The	model	of	an	individual’s	decision	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 commit	 a	 crime	 is	 no	 different.	 If	 the	 benefits	 of	committing	a	crime	(increased	income,	personal	enjoyment,	etc.)	outweigh	the	costs	(prison	time,	fines,	society’s	disapproval,	etc.),	the	individual	will	commit	that	crime.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 the	 costs	 of	 committing	 a	 crime	 outweigh	 the	 benefits,	 the	individual	will	not	 commit	 that	 crime.	Potential	 criminals	base	 their	decision	on	a	comparison	of	 the	utility	 (i.e.,	well-being)	 they	would	receive	via	 legal	 income	(no	crime)	with	the	expected	utility	from	committing	a	crime,	which	takes	into	account	the	probabilities	 of	 success	 (not	 getting	 caught)	 and	 failure	 (getting	 caught).	 If	 an	individual’s	expected	utility	from	committing	a	crime	is	greater	than	her	utility	from	not	 committing	 a	 crime,	 then	 that	 individual	 will	 break	 the	 law.	 This	 simple	economic	 model	 of	 criminal	 behavior	 suggests	 there	 are	 several	 ways	 to	 deter	crime,	 such	 as	 increasing	 the	 utility	 that	 people	 receive	 from	 not	 engaging	 in	criminal	 activity	 (e.g.,	 increasing	 legal	 income),	 or	 decreasing	 the	 expected	 utility	that	 crime	 would	 generate	 (e.g.,	 increasing	 the	 cost	 of	 crime).	 Several	 academic	papers	have	studied	the	determinants	of	crime.	Becker	 (1968)	 explains	 that	 three	main	 determinants	 of	 crime	 that	 can	 be	observed	 and	 influenced	 via	 policy	 are	 the	 probability	 of	 arrest,	 the	 severity	 of	punishment,	and	an	amalgamation	of	other	social	and	economic	indicators,	the	most	
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important	being	legal	income.	An	increase	in	any	of	these	is	expected	to	reduce	the	number	of	 crimes	 that	an	 individual	 commits;	 the	 first	 two	decrease	 the	expected	utility	 of	 crime	 and	 the	 latter	 increases	 the	 utility	 gained	 through	 legal	 activity.	Howsen	 and	 Jarrell	 (1987)	 reach	 slightly	 different	 conclusions	 in	 their	 empirical	study.	They	show	that	property	crime	is	influenced	by	the	probability	of	arrest	and	the	unemployment	 rate,	but	not	by	 the	severity	of	punishment.	Kelly	 (2000)	 finds	that	property	crime	is	linked	to	poverty	and	police	activity,	and	that	violent	crime	is	linked	 to	 levels	 of	 income	 inequality.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	deterrence,	 while	 reducing	 the	 social	 costs	 of	 crime,	 generates	 significant	 social	costs	of	 its	own.	For	example,	 increasing	the	probability	of	arrest	generates	higher	costs	through	more	police	training,	an	increase	in	the	number	of	officers	(and	thus	salaries	 to	be	paid),	 or	 an	 improvement	 in	police	 technology.	 Likewise,	 increasing	the	severity	of	arrest	often	generates	higher	costs	as	a	result	of	lengthier	prison	or	probation	 sentences	 that	both	 require	 labor	and	 resources	 (Becker,	1968).	Hence,	the	aim	of	policy-makers	and	 law	enforcement	ought	not	 to	be	 to	eradicate	crime,	but	 to	 reach	 an	 optimal	 social	 level	 of	 crime,	 where	 the	 marginal	 cost	 of	victimization	equals	the	marginal	cost	of	crime	prevention.			The	aforementioned	studies	have	empirically	shown	that	(legal)	income	is	an	important	 determinant	 of	 an	 individual’s	 crime	 decision.	 This	 study	 examines	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 growth	 and	 variability	 of	 income	 (termed	 the	 “business	cycle”)	and	 the	growth	and	variability	of	various	crime	rates	using	aggregate	 time	series	data	on	income	and	crime	rates	for	Mississippi.	The	use	of	aggregate	income	and	 crime	 data	 rather	 than	 individual-level	 data	 will	 provide	 evidence	 on	 how	
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crimes	 respond	 to	 the	 business	 cycle	 in	 Mississippi.	 The	 predictions	 from	 my	aggregate	 analysis	 are	 similar	 to	 those	 from	 the	 model	 of	 the	 individual’s	 crime	decision	under	the	assumption	that	all	individuals	have	similar	preferences	(utility).	However,	since	there	is	a	significant	amount	of	variation	among	the	cities	and	towns	within	Mississippi	in	terms	of	income,	the	number	of	police,	social	customs,	etc.,	an	aggregated	unit	of	analysis	may	generate	results	different	than	those	that	have	been	found	 to	exist	on	an	 individual	 level.	This	 thesis	 thus	also	demonstrates	how	well	aggregate	data	can	replicate	the	results	from	studies	using	less-aggregated	data.		My	empirical	analysis	uses	annual	state-level	data	on	real	per	capita	personal	income	 and	 seven	 different	 crime	 rates	 (murder,	 rape,	 robbery,	 assault,	 burglary,	larceny,	and	vehicle	theft)	for	the	state	of	Mississippi	over	the	years	1969-2015	(due	to	data	availability).	I	analyze	the	behavior	of	four	crime	variables	over	the	business	cycle	 –	 burglary,	 larceny,	 vehicle	 theft,	 and	 violent	 crimes	 (which	 is	 the	 sum	 of	murder,	rape,	robbery,	and	assault)	–	by	performing	regression	analyses	to	estimate	long-run	 income	 elasticities	 (to	 capture	 crime	 growth)	 and	 short-run	 income	elasticities	(to	capture	year-to-year	variability	in	crime).	My	results	indicate,	that	in	the	short	run,	the	relationship	between	income	and	each	of	the	crime	rates	is	only	statistically	 significant	 for	 larceny,	 and	 is	 negative	 in	 this	 case.	 This	 implies	 that	year-to-year	 changes	 in	 income	 have	 no	 effect	 on	 year-to-year	 changes	 in	 crime	rates	 other	 than	 larceny.	 The	 relationship	 between	 non-income	 recession	characteristics	and	burglary	is	also	statistically	significant	and	positive	in	the	short	run.	In	the	long	run,	the	only	statistically	significant	relationships	found	are	between	
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larceny	and	 income	and	burglary	and	 income,	signifying	that	burglary	and	 larceny	have	a	negative	relationship	with	income	over	time.	The	 thesis	 proceeds	 in	 four	 additional	 chapters.	 Chapter	 II	 reviews	 the	academic	 literature	 on	 crime	 and	 the	 business	 cycle	 and	 discusses	 the	 economic	model	 of	 crime.	 Chapter	 III	 proposes	 my	 research	 question	 and	 details	 the	 data	sources	and	empirical	methodology	used.	Chapter	IV	presents	the	results	obtained	from	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 III.	 This	 chapter	 also	 includes	 a	discussion	 surrounding	 these	 results	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 predictions	 made	 in	Chapter	 III.	 Finally,	 Chapter	 V	 concludes	 with	 a	 review	 of	 the	 research	 objective,	methodology,	 and	 results,	 while	 also	 discussing	 policy	 implications	 and	 potential	opportunities	for	further	research.														
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Chapter	II:	Literature	Review	and	Conceptual	Framework	
Literature	Review		 This	 section	 focuses	on	 the	previous	 academic	 literature	 that	 examines	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 business	 cycle	 and	 crime	 rates.	 The	 findings	 of	 these	studies	 serve	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 my	 conceptual	 model	 and	 empirical	 methodology	presented	 later.	 These	 previous	 studies	 have	 identified	 four	 theoretical	 channels	through	 which	 changes	 in	 the	 business	 cycle	 may	 influence	 violent	 crime	 and	property	crime	rates.		First,	 a	 recession	may	 lead	 to	 increases	 in	both	violent	 crime	and	property	crime	 by	 decreasing	 the	 availability	 of	 legal	 means	 to	 earn	 income	 and	 the	opportunity	 cost	 of	 punishment	 resulting	 from	 failed	 crimes	 (Cook	 and	 Zarkin,	1985).	 Higher	 rates	 of	 unemployment	 will	 cause	 many	 to	 receive	 a	 lower	 real	income,	leading	each	affected	individual	to	experience	a	lower	utility	of	legal	wealth.	A	 lower	 real	 income	 also	 implies	 that	 an	 individual’s	 opportunity	 cost	 of	 time	 is	lower.	Hence,	an	individual	with	a	lower	income	will	not	have	to	forego	as	much	in	order	to	allocate	time	to	crime	rather	than	legal	work.	This	should	result	in	a	higher	expected	utility	of	crime,	all	else	equal.	As	a	result,	each	individual’s	utility	of	wealth	may	 decrease	 relative	 to	 her	 expected	 utility	 of	 crime,	making	 individuals	 on	 the	margin	more	likely	to	commit	a	crime.	Paternoster	and	Bushway	(2001)	refer	to	this	linkage	as	the	“motivational	effect”.	
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Second,	 the	 decreased	 allocation	 of	 available	 resources	 toward	 police	 and	corrections	activities	that	occurs	during	a	recession	may	also	increase	both	property	and	 violent	 crimes	 rates	 (Bushway,	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Any	 existing	 deterrent	 effect	 on	crime	from	police	or	court	activities	may	be	diminished	when	funding	and	resources	decrease.	 However,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 during	 periods	 of	 decreased	 funding	police	may	adjust	by	placing	a	greater	priority	on	the	prevention	of	felonies	rather	than	on	the	prevention	of	misdemeanors	(Corman,	et	al.,	2001),	meaning	less	costly	crimes	 (such	 as	 petty	 theft)	may	 increase	more	 than	more	 costly	 crimes	 (such	 as	murder).		Third,	 the	 decrease	 in	 the	 availability	 of	 legal	 work	 opportunities	 may	 be	accompanied	 by	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 availability	 of	 illegal	means	 of	 increasing	 one’s	wealth.	This	hypothesized	shortage	of	opportunities	for	crime	is	generally	believed	to	exert	downward	pressure	on	property	crime	rates,	and,	furthermore,	Paternoster	and	 Bushway	 (2001)	 theorize	 that	 this	 could	 also	 have	 a	 negative	 influence	 on	violent	crime	rates.	Regardless	of	whether	or	not	there	is	a	greater	desire	to	commit	crimes	 (both	 property	 and	 violent),	 the	 onset	 of	 a	 recession	 may	 decrease	 the	availability	of	opportunities	to	actually	do	so	(Cook	and	Zarkin,	1985).	Paternoster	and	 Bushway	 (2001)	 refer	 to	 this	 linkage	 as	 the	 “guardianship	 effect”,	 since	 the	overall	 lower	 employment	 rate	 that	 is	 characteristic	 of	 recessions	 implies	 that	 a	greater	percentage	of	people	will	be	at	home,	rather	than	at	work	and	in	public,	thus	making	themselves	less	available	to	be	victimized	and	their	property	less	likely	to	be	stolen.		
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Finally,	 the	decreased	 level	of	drug	and	alcohol	 consumption	 that	has	been	shown	to	occur	during	recessions	could	exacerbate	this	downward	pressure,	since	potential	 crimes	 (either	 property	 or	 violent)	 motivated	 by	 the	 perpetrator’s	intoxication	could	be	prevented	(Bushway,	et	al.,	2012).3			Clearly,	many	of	 the	various	 influences	of	 the	business	cycle	on	crime	rates	exert	conflicting	pressures.	As	such,	researchers	have	performed	several	empirical	tests	in	order	to	determine	which	influence	dominates.			 Two	such	tests	were	performed	by	Cook	and	Zarkin	(1985).	Their	 first	 test	involves	 comparing	 the	 average	 annual	 growth	 rate	 of	 each	 crime	 (burglary,	robbery,	auto	theft,	and	criminal	homicide)	during	each	expansion	period	with	the	growth	rate	of	that	crime	in	the	following	year.	Their	analysis	is	predicated	on	the	idea	that,	should	a	particular	crime	have	no	relationship	with	the	business	cycle,	the	number	of	post-expansion	years	with	higher	growth	rates	for	that	crime	should	be	roughly	 equal	 to	 the	 number	 of	 post-expansion	 years	 with	 lower	 growth	 rates,	compared	 to	 the	 average	 growth	 rate	during	 the	 expansion	period.	Moreover,	 if	 a	particular	crime	and	the	business	cycle	possess	an	inverse	relationship,	the	number	of	 post-expansion	 years	 with	 higher	 growth	 rates	 should	 be	 greater	 than	 the	
																																																								3	To	 illustrate	 the	 conflicting	 effects	 of	 these	 various	 forces,	 imagine	 an	 individual,	 Sally,	 who	 is	considering	supplementing	her	legal	income	by	pickpocketing	tourists.	A	recession	may	lead	Sally	to	be	more	 inclined	to	such	an	undertaking,	as	her	real	 income	may	decrease.	However,	her	ability	 to	pickpocket	may	be	severely	hindered	by,	for	example,	the	lowered	numbers	of	tourists	or	the	fewer	valuable	objects	that	any	tourists	would	carry	with	them	during	the	recession.	She	may	also	be	aware	that	the	recently	constrained	resources	of	the	local	police	department	has	led	to	decreased	patrolling	in	the	area,	lowering	her	chances	of	being	caught	and,	thus,	increasing	her	expected	utility	of	wealth.	Finally,	since	Sally	has	less	disposable	income,	she	has	been	consuming	less	alcohol,	largely	negating	any	 chance	 that	 Sally	will	 pickpocket	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 spur	 of	 the	moment	 decision	 brought	 on	 by	intoxication.	Likewise,	all	of	the	existing	tourists	in	her	town	will	be	consuming	less	alcohol	overall	as	well,	making	them	more	aware	of	their	surroundings	and	more	difficult	from	whom	to	steal.			
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number	 of	 post-expansion	 years	 with	 lower	 growth	 rates,	 and	 vice	 versa	 for	 a	positive	 relationship.	 For	 each	 crime,	 the	 authors	 view	 each	 business	 cycle	 as	 an	independent	 trial	 in	 an	 experiment	 and	 use	 the	 binomial	 hypothesis	 test	 to	determine	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	each	crime	and	the	business	cycle.	The	 authors	 find	 that	 the	 business	 cycle	 has	 an	 inverse	 relationship	 with	 both	burglary	and	robbery.	They	find	no	statistically	significant	relationship	between	the	business	cycle	and	either	murder	or	vehicle	theft.			Bushway,	et	al.	(2012)	use	the	same	non-parametric	test	as	Cook	and	Zarkin	(1985),	but	are	able	to	extend	the	analysis	and	bolster	the	previous	results	with	the	added	 benefit	 of	 26	more	 years	 of	 data,	 including	 four	 additional	 business	 cycles.	Their	 findings	are	 in	 line	with	those	of	Cook	and	Zarkin	(1985);	 they	 find	that	 the	business	 cycle	 has	 an	 inverse	 relationship	 with	 robbery	 and	 burglary	 and	 no	relationship	with	murder	and	vehicle	theft.	While	 the	 analyses	described	 above	 lend	 support	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 property	crime	 rates	 other	 than	 vehicle	 theft	 rise	 during	 recessions	 and	 that	 violent	 crime	rates	other	than	robbery	are	unaffected,	they	are	not	able	to	provide	indications	of	the	size	of	any	detected	effects.	Furthermore,	contrary	to	the	assertion	of	Bushway,	et	 al.	 (2012),	 it	 is	 not	 universally	 agreed	 that	 the	 non-parametric	 tests	 provide	sufficient	evidence	for	causality.	 In	order	to	address	these	shortcomings,	Cook	and	Zarkin	 (1985)	 supplement	 the	 non-parametric	 analysis	 with	 an	 econometric	analysis.	They	use	the	unemployment	rate	and	the	employment-population	ratio	as	measures	 of	 the	 business	 cycle,	 and	 they	 separately	 regress	 each	 measure	 on	burglary,	robbery,	auto	 theft,	and	criminal	homicide	using	a	 log-level	model.	Their	
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results	 show	 that	 as	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 increases	 (decreases),	 burglary	 and	larceny	 increase	 (decrease).	 Additionally,	 as	 the	 employment-population	 ratio	increases	(decreases),	burglary	and	larceny	decrease	(increase).	The	authors	again	find	 no	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 between	 criminal	 homicide	 and	 either	dependent	variable.		By	 examining	 vehicle	 theft,	 Paternoster	 and	 Bushway	 (2001)	 aim	 to	 shed	light	on	the	effect	that	disentangling	the	motivational	and	guardianship	effects	can	have	on	our	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	the	business	cycle	and	crime	rates.	Although	vehicle	theft	is	a	property	crime	and,	in	that	respect,	is	expected	to	be	 countercyclical	 with	 the	 business	 cycle,	 many	 tests	 indicate	 that	 its	 rates	 are	either	unrelated	to	or	procyclical	with	the	business	cycle.	They	 point	 out,	 however,	 that	 these	 studies	 make	 no	 distinction	 between	vehicle	 theft	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 making	 a	 profit	 and	 for	 joyriding	 (which	 is	presumably	less	influenced,	if	at	all,	by	economic	considerations).	They	perform	the	nonparametric	 analysis	 of	 vehicle	 theft	 initially	 used	 by	 Cook	 and	 Zarkin	 (1985),	this	 time	 distinguishing	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 vehicle	 theft.	 They	 find	 that	joyriding	vehicle	 theft	rates	are	countercyclical	with	 the	business	cycle.	The	result	for	profit-motivated	vehicle	theft	could	indicate	that	either	there	is	no	relationship	between	 its	 rates	 and	 the	 business	 cycle,	 or	 that	 the	 opposing	 forces	 of	 both	 the	motivational	and	the	guardianship	effects	are	at	work.		Corman,	et	al.	(1987)	use	a	vector	autoregressive	(VAR)	technique	to	analyze	the	interrelated	dynamics	of	crime	rates	for	felony	property	crimes	(grand	larceny,	
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robbery,	burglary,	and	auto	theft)	and	the	unemployment	rate.4	Their	study	adds	to	the	 literature	by	observing	crime	rates	only	 for	New	York	City	between	1970	and	1984,	rather	than	for	the	entire	U.S.	By	regressing	the	crime	rate	in	New	York	City	on	 four	 lags	 of	 the	 city’s	 unemployment	 rate,	 the	 authors	 are	not	 able	 to	detect	 a	joint	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 between	 unemployment	 and	 crime.	 By	analyzing	 the	 impulse	 response	 functions	 of	 each	 of	 the	 variables	 to	 a	 shock	 in	unemployment	by	one	 standard	deviation,	 however,	 they	 show	 that	 shocks	 in	 the	unemployment	rate	are	generally	followed	by	a	spike	in	felony	property	crime	rates	that	 is	quite	short	 in	nature	(about	1	month)	due	to	a	 following	sustained	 jump	in	the	arrest	rate.			 Corman	 and	 Joyce	 (1990)	 also	 use	 similar	 methods	 to	 examine	 the	interrelationships	between	crime	and	various	deterrent	and	economic	variables	 in	New	 York	 City.	 They	 are	 not	 able	 to	 detect	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	between	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 and	 any	 of	 the	 four	 violent	 crimes	 under	consideration	–	murder,	rape,	robbery,	and	assault	–	in	the	short	run	over	the	period	1970-1986.			
Conceptual	Framework:	The	Economic	Model	of	Crime	The	empirical	 studies	described	 in	 the	previous	section	provide	compelling	evidence	in	support	of	a	countercyclical	relationship	between	the	business	cycle	and	property	crime	(disregarding	vehicle	theft).	There	is,	therefore,	a	general	consensus	on	 the	 effect	 of	 increased	 legal	 income	 on	 the	 decision	 to	 commit	 burglary	 or	
																																																								4	Unlike	 the	 other	 papers	 discussed	 in	 this	 literature	 review,	 this	 study	 categorizes	 robbery	 as	 a	property	 crime,	 highlighting	 the	 fact	 that	 robbery	 has	 motivations	 rooted	 in	 both	 financial	 and	violent	desires.			
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larceny.	Missing	from	the	existing	literature,	however,	is	a	mathematical	model	and	proof	 to	 provide	 theoretical	 foundations	 to	 the	 established	 empirical	 finding	 that	higher	legal	income	reduces	individuals’	propensities	to	commit	crime.	This	section	rigorously	demonstrates	that	an	increase	in	legal	income	will	reduce	propensity	to	commit	crime.	Consider	 an	 individual	 who	 is	 initially	 indifferent	 between	 committing	 a	crime	and	not	committing	a	crime.	In	this	case,	the	individual’s	utility	of	legal	wealth	is	equal	to	her	expected	utility	of	wealth	from	crime.		Let	the	individual’s	utility	of	legal	wealth	(𝑤)	be	represented	by	the	following	function:	 𝑈 𝑤 = ln (𝑤).	This	 utility	 function	 assumes	 that	 the	 individual	 displays	 diminishing	 marginal	utility	 of	 wealth.	 That	 is,	 her	 utility	 increases	 with	 respect	 to	 income,	 but	 each	subsequent	 unit	 increase	 in	 income	 generates	 a	 smaller	 increase	 in	 utility.	 The	individual’s	expected	utility	of	wealth	from	committing	a	crime	is	represented	as:	𝐸 𝑈 𝑤 = 𝑝! ∙ ln 𝑤 + 𝑤! + 𝑝! ∙ ln 𝑤 − 𝛼𝑤 − 𝐴,	where	 0 < 𝑝! < 1 	denotes	 the	 probability	 of	 success,	 0 < 𝑝! < 1 	denotes	 the	probability	of	failure,	and	𝑤!	represents	the	gains	in	wealth	from	a	successful	crime.	Clearly,	𝑝! + 𝑝! = 1.	The	individual’s	non-negative	anguish	cost	(𝐴),	represents	the	moral	or	social	costs	that	one	incurs	upon	committing	a	crime.	An	individual	who	is	more	 sensitive	 to	 how	 her	 actions	 are	 perceived	 by	 society	 would	 have	 a	 higher	anguish	cost,	as	would	an	individual	who	has	strong	moral	objections	to	crime.	The	resultant	loss	in	utility	from	getting	caught	committing	a	crime	is	ln (𝑤 − 𝛼𝑤).	The	
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decrease	in	wealth	from	a	failed	crime	(𝛼𝑤)	is	dependent	on	initial,	legal	wealth	to	capture	the	increasing	opportunity	cost	of	a	crime	as	one’s	wealth	increases.	That	is,	for	some	constant	0 < 𝛼 < 1,	an	individual	will	lose	a	greater	amount	of	wealth	due	to	a	failed	crime	as	her	legal	wealth	increases.			 The	 general	model	 represented	 above	 serves	 as	 the	basis	 for	 the	 following	proposition:		
Proposition:	 An	 increase	 in	 legal	wealth	will	 increase	 an	 individual’s	 utility	 of	 legal	
wealth	more	than	it	will	increase	her	expected	utility	of	wealth	of	committing	a	crime.	
As	 a	 result,	 an	 initially	 indifferent	 individual	 will	 not	 commit	 a	 crime	 if	 her	 legal	
wealth	 increases.	 Thus,	 if	 the	 above	 model	 is	 generalized	 for	 all	 individuals,	 crime	
should	fall	as	legal	wealth	increases.		Proof	of	Proposition:	In	order	to	prove	the	proposition,	I	must	show	that	the	change	in	an	individual’s	utility	resulting	from	a	change	in	legal	wealth	is	greater	than	the	change	in	that	individual’s	expected	utility	of	wealth	resulting	from	the	same	change	in	legal	wealth.		The	individual’s	utility	function	for	legal	wealth	is	𝑈 𝑤 = 𝑙𝑛 𝑤 .		The	change	in	utility	of	legal	wealth	with	respect	to	a	change	in	legal	wealth	is	𝜕𝑈(𝑤)𝜕𝑤 = 1𝑤 > 0, for 𝑤 > 0.      (1)	The	individual’s	expected	utility	function	is	𝐸 𝑈 𝑤 = 𝑝! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 𝑤 + 𝑤! + 𝑝! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 𝑤 − 𝛼𝑤 − 𝐴,	or,	by	noting	that	𝑝! = 1− 𝑝!,		
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𝐸 𝑈 𝑤 = 𝑝! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 𝑤 + 𝑤! + 1− 𝑝! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 𝑤 − 𝛼𝑤 − 𝐴.					(2)	The	change	in	expected	utility	with	respect	to	a	change	in	legal	wealth	is	found	by	differentiating	equation	(2)	with	respect	to	𝑤:	𝜕𝐸 𝑈 𝑤𝜕𝑤 = 𝑝!𝑤 + 𝑤! + 1− 𝑝!𝑤 − 𝛼𝑤 ∙ 1− 𝛼 	= 𝑝!𝑤 + 𝑤! + 1− 𝑝!𝑤 	= 𝑤 ∙ 𝑝!𝑤 ∙ (𝑤 + 𝑤!)+ (1− 𝑝!) ∙ (𝑤 + 𝑤!)𝑤 ∙ (𝑤 + 𝑤!) 	
= 𝑤 ∙ 𝑝! + 𝑤 ∙ 1− 𝑝! + 𝑤! ∙ 1− 𝑝!𝑤 ∙ 𝑤 + 𝑤! 	
= 1𝑤 ∙ 𝑤 + 𝑤! ∙ 1− 𝑝!𝑤 + 𝑤! .      (3) Substituting	equation	(1)	into	equation	(3)	yields	𝜕𝐸[𝑈 𝑤 ]𝜕𝑤 = 𝜕𝑈(𝑤)𝜕𝑤 ∙ 𝑤 + 𝑤! ∙ 1− 𝑝!𝑤 + 𝑤! .      (4)	Rearranging	equation	(4)	gives		𝜕𝐸[𝑈 𝑤 ]𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑈(𝑤)𝜕𝑤 = 𝑤 + 𝑤! ∙ (1− 𝑝!)𝑤 + 𝑤!  .	Since	0 < 𝑝! < 1,	it	must	be	that	𝑤 + 𝑤! ∙ 1− 𝑝! < 𝑤 + 𝑤!.	So,	𝜕𝐸[𝑈 𝑤 ]𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑈(𝑤)𝜕𝑤 = 𝑤 + 𝑤! ∙ (1− 𝑝!)𝑤 + 𝑤! < 1,      (5)	which	implies	that		 𝜕𝐸[𝑈 𝑤 ]𝜕𝑤 < 𝜕𝑈(𝑤)𝜕𝑤  , 	
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which	 is	 the	desired	result	 that	an	 increase	 in	 legal	wealth	will	generate	a	greater	change	in	utility	of	legal	wealth	than	in	expected	utility	of	wealth.	
n
		 Both	 the	 previous	 academic	 literature	 and	 the	 mathematical	 model	presented	 above	 suggest	 an	 individual	 facing	 increased	 legal	 income	 will	 be	 less	likely	to	commit	a	crime	that	is	motivated	by	financial	concerns.	Several	tests	have	shown	that	the	business	cycle	has	no	influence	on	violent	crime	rates	but	a	negative	effect	on	property	crime	rates	other	than	vehicle	theft.	The	next	section	will	present	tests	 used	 to	 determine	 whether	 this	 relationship	 is	 also	 observable	 at	 the	 state	level	for	Mississippi.										
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Chapter	III:	Empirical	Methodology	and	Data		 This	 chapter	 presents	 the	 data	 and	 the	 empirical	 methodology	 I	 use	 to	examine	 the	effect	of	 the	business	cycle	on	 the	crime	rates	 in	Mississippi	over	 the	time	period	1969-2015.	As	the	business	cycle	consists	of	both	the	growth	of	income	and	the	variability	of	income,	my	methodology	is	divided	into	two	main	sections:	1)	the	 long-run	empirical	model	(to	capture	the	relationship	between	 income	growth	and	 crime	 growth),	 and	 2)	 the	 short-run	 empirical	 model	 (to	 capture	 the	relationship	 between	 income	 variability	 and	 crime	 rate	 variability).	 I	 also	 discuss	the	data	that	I	use	and	my	expectations	for	the	results.			 To	estimate	the	empirical	models,	I	use	Mississippi-level	data	on	crime	rates	and	real	per	capita	personal	income	for	the	period	of	1969	to	2015.5.	I	consider	four	crimes	–	violent	crime	(murder,	rape,	robbery,	and	assault),	 larceny,	burglary,	and	auto	theft.	The	numbers	for	each	crime	were	obtained	from	the	FBI’s	Unified	Crime	Report.	 I	 converted	 these	 data	 into	 crimes	 per	 capita	 by	 dividing	 each	 crime	 by	Mississippi	 population.6	I	 calculated	 real	 income	 per	 capita	 using	 the	 Consumer	Price	 Index	 (CPI)	 and	 income	 and	 population	 data.7	To	 account	 for	 non-income	economic	 factors	 that	 might	 influence	 crime	 (e.g.,	 unemployment),	 I	 obtained	recession/expansion	classifications	for	each	year	in	my	sample	period	provided	by	
																																																								5	1969	is	the	earliest	year	for	which	the	crime	data	I	use	is	available.	6	Population	data	are	from	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	(BEA).	7	These	population	data	are	also	from	the	BEA.	
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the	National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research.	Figure	1	presents	the	Mississippi	crime	rates	over	the	period	1969	to	2015.			
	
	
Long-Run	Empirical	Model			 To	analyze	 the	effect	of	 income	growth	on	 the	growth	 in	each	crime	rate,	 I	estimate	the	following	model:	𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! ∙ 𝑙𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒! + 𝛼! ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝛼! ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀! .8					(6)		 I	 estimate	 this	model	 for	 each	 type	of	 crime,	denoted	as	𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒! .	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!	is	real	per	capita	income,	and	𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛!	is	a	dummy	variable	that	has	a	value	of	‘1’	for	years	in	which	six	or	more	months	of	that	year	were	classified	as	a	recession,	and	‘0’	otherwise.	𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑!	is	a	time	index	and	takes	the	value	of	1	for	year	1969,	2	for	1970,	
																																																								8	All	models	control	for	autocorrelation	using	the	Cochrane-Orcutt	procedure	when	necessary.	
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3	for	1971,	and	so	on,	and	is	included	to	capture	the	average	annual	growth	in	crime	that	is	not	due	to	changes	in	income	or	recessions.9			 The	 estimate	 of	𝛼!is	 the	 long-run	 income-elasticity	 of	 each	 crime	 (i.e.,	 the	percent	change	in	crime	for	a	percent	change	in	income	over	the	sample	period).10	Given	 the	 previous	 academic	 literature	 and	 the	 theoretical	 model	 discussed	 in	Chapter	 II,	 I	 expect	𝛼!	to	be	zero	 for	violent	 crime	and	 less	 than	zero	 for	burglary	and	larceny.	The	expected	sign	of	the	coefficient	for	vehicle	theft	is	less	clear	due	to	the	 contradictory	 conclusions	 concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 business	cycle	 and	 vehicle	 theft	 given	 by	 theoretical	 models	 and	 empirical	 results.	 The	dummy	 variable	 coefficient,	𝛼!,	 captures	 the	 non-income	 effect	 of	 a	 recession	 on	crime	 rates.11	I	 expect	 the	 estimate	 of	𝛼!	to	 be	 zero	 for	 violent	 crime	 and	 greater	than	zero	for	burglary	and	larceny.		
Short-Run	Empirical	Model		 To	 analyze	 the	 effect	 of	 year-to-year	 variability	 of	 income	 on	 year-to-year	variability	of	crime	rates,	I	estimate	the	following	model	for	each	crime:	△ 𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒!) =  𝛽! + 𝛽! ∙△ 𝑙𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!)+ 𝛽! ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜐! ,					(7)	where	∆	represents	 the	 first	difference	of	 the	 respective	variable.12	All	variables	 in	the	model	above	use	the	same	data	as	in	the	previous	section.		
																																																								9	Dickey-Fuller	 tests	 for	 stationarity	 were	 run	 for	 income	 and	 each	 crime	 variable.	 Violent	 crime,	burglary,	and	larceny	were	found	to	be	stationary,	while	vehicle	theft	and	income	were	found	to	be	nonstationary.	The	trend	variable	is	included	because	income	is	nonstationary.	Because	both	income	and	vehicle	theft	are	nonstationary,	long-run	results	pertaining	to	their	relationship	with	each	other	are	likely	spurious.		10	For	 example,	 an	 estimate	of	𝛼! = 0.5	would	 imply	 that	 a	 1%	 increase	 in	 income	would	 lead	 to	 a	0.5%	increase	in	the	crime	rate.	11	The	existence	of	a	recession	will	result	in	an	estimated	change	in	the	crime	rate	of	𝑒!!!!.	12	All	 short-run	models	also	control	 for	autocorrelation	using	 the	Cochrane-Orcutt	procedure	when	necessary.	
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	 The	 coefficient	𝛽! 	is	 the	 short-run	 income-elasticity	 and	 represents	 the	sensitivity	 of	 year-to-year	 changes	 in	 the	 crime	 rate	 resulting	 from	 year-to-year	changes	in	income.	I	expect	𝛽!	to	be	zero	for	violent	crime	and	negative	for	burglary,	larceny,	 and	 (possibly)	 vehicle	 theft.	 	 The	 recession	 dummy	 variable	 reflects	 the	average	yearly	change	in	crime	resulting	from	non-income	related	characteristics	of	recessions.13	I	 have	 similar	 expectations	 for	 the	 sign	 of	 these	 estimates	 as	 for	 the	estimates	of	𝛼!.																																																																								13	The	 coefficient	 on	 the	 recession	 dummy	 retains	 the	 same	 interpretation	 as	 in	 the	 long-run	empirical	model:	𝑒!!!!.		
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Chapter	IV:	Empirical	Results	and	Discussion		 This	 chapter	 presents	 the	 empirical	 results	 from	 the	 regression	 models	presented	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 I	 provide	 further	 context	 for	 these	 results	 by	comparing	 them	 to	 the	predictions	given	 in	 chapter	 III	 and	by	discussing	possible	explanations	for	any	discrepancies.		Table	 1	 shows	 the	 results	 for	 the	 long-run	 empirical	model	 (6),	 estimated	once	for	each	crime.			 Table1:	Long-Run	Effect	of	Income	Growth	on	Crime	Variable		 Dependent	Var.	ln(ViolentCrime)	(1)	 Dependent	Var.	ln(Burglary)	(2)	 Dependent	Var.	ln(Larceny)	(3)	 Dependent	Var.	ln(VehicleTheft)	(4)	
Constant	(𝛼!)	 -9.752	(6.082)	 6.119	(5.346)	 7.823**	(3.818)	 -7.764	(11.42)	
ln(Income)(𝛼!)	 0.443	(0.62)	 -1.032*	(0.542)	 -1.09***	(0.382)	 0.276	(1.144)	
Recession	
Dummy	(𝛼!)	 -0.007	(0.027)	 0.023	(0.023)	 0.014	(0.016)	 -0.004	(0.048)	
Trend	(𝛼!)	 -0.017	(0.010)	 -0.001	(0.01)	 -0.007	(0.009)	 -0.031	(0.027)	Adj.	𝑅!	 0.042	 0.146	 0.213	 -0.035	Number	of	Observations	 46	 46	 46	 46	Note:	*	=	significant	at	10%,	**=significant	at	5%,	***=significant	at	1%.	Autocorrelation	is	corrected	for	when	needed.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		
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The	results	in	Table	1	reveal	that	the	income	elasticity	estimates	for	burglary	and	 larceny	 are	 negative	 and	 statistically	 significant,	 having	 values	 of	 -1.032	 and											-1.09,	respectively.	In	both	cases,	crime	growth	decreases	(increases)	more	than	an	increase	 (decrease)	 in	 income.	 This	 finding	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 my	 theoretical	predictions	and	with	 the	results	 from	the	research	performed	by	Cook	and	Zarkin	and	 Bushway,	 et	 al.	 All	 other	 long-run	 estimates	 of	 interest	 are	 statistically	insignificant,	 suggesting	 that	 vehicle	 theft	 and	 violent	 crime	 do	 not	 grow	 with	respect	to	income	growth,	and	that	non-income	recession	features	have	no	effect	on	crime	growth.		Table	2	shows	the	results	from	the	short-run	empirical	model	(7),	which	was	also	estimated	for	each	crime.	 	Table	2:	Short-Run	Effect	of	Income	Changes	on	Crime	
Variable	 Dependent	Var.	𝛥𝑙𝑛 (𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒)	(1)	 Dependent	Var.	𝛥𝑙𝑛 (𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦)	(2)	 Dependent	Var.	𝛥 𝑙𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑦 	(3)	 Dependent	Var.	Δln (𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑓𝑡)	(4)	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡	(𝛽!)	 0.021	(0.028)	 0.011	(0.024)	 0.031	(0.019)	 -0.013	(0.034)	
Δ𝑙𝑛 (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)	(𝛽!)	 -0.622	(0.666)	 -0.286	(0.684)	 -0.811*	(0.453)	 1.341	(1.195)	
Recession	(𝛽!)	 -0.034	(0.038)	 0.077*	(0.039)	 0.002	(0.026)	 0.025	(0.069)	Adj.	𝑅!	 -0.019	 0.083	 0.045	 -0.015	Number	of	Observations	 45	 45	 45	 45	Note:	*	=	significant	at	10%,	**=significant	at	5%,	***=significant	at	1%.	Autocorrelation	is	corrected	for	when	needed.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		 	
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The	 statistically	 significant	 estimate	 of	 the	 income	 elasticity	 of	 larceny	 is	inelastic	and,	as	predicted,	negative.	The	estimate	of	-0.81	suggests	that	year-to-year	increases	(decreases)	in	income	result	in	smaller	year-to-year	decreases	(increases)	in	 larceny	 rates.	 The	 estimate	 of	 the	 coefficient	 on	 Recession	 for	 burglary	 is	 also	statistically	significant	and	is,	as	expected,	positive,	suggesting	that	the	occurrence	of	 recessions	 causes	higher	 rates	 of	 burglary	due	 to	non-income	 factors.	All	 other	short-run	estimates	are	statistically	insignificant.			 Several	 reasons	 may	 explain	 why	 so	 few	 estimates	 are	 statistically	significant.	First,	the	use	of	state-level	data	to	examine	a	phenomenon	that	occurs	on	the	individual	level	is	a	primary	factor.	Furthermore,	Mississippi’s	population	is	not	homogenous	across	 the	state.	Some	areas	are	 rural,	while	others	are	urban.	Areas	like	 the	 Delta	 region	 experience	 endemic	 poverty,	while	 other	 areas	 like	 the	 Gulf	Coast	 and	 Jackson	 suburbs	 are	 comparatively	 wealthy.	 The	 crime	 data	 for	Mississippi	 aggregates	 and	gives	 equal	weight	 to	 the	 crime	 rates	 from	all	 of	 these	areas.	 Hence,	 the	 variation	 in	 Mississippi	 could	 generate	 dissonance	 between	aggregate-level	 and	 individual-level	 estimates	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 income	(the	business	cycle)	and	crime.	As	mentioned	in	the	literature	review	of	Chapter	II,	another	source	of	this	dissonance	may	be	conflicting	influences	of	guardianship	and	the	motivational	 effects.14	In	 their	 examination	of	 vehicle	 theft	 and	business	 cycle,	Paternoster	 and	 Bushway	 (2001)	 demonstrate	 one	 example	 of	 a	 method	 of	
																																																								14	Recall	 that	 the	 motivational	 effect	 is	 the	 theoretical	 increase	 in	 an	 individual’s	 propensity	 to	commit	a	crime	resulting	 from	the	 fewer	opportunities	 to	 increase	 legal	wealth	during	a	recession.	The	guardianship	effect	 is	 the	 theoretical	decrease	 in	an	 individual’s	propensity	 to	commit	a	crime	resulting	 from	 the	 higher	 proportion	 of	 people	 remaining	 at	 home	 (and	 thus	 “guarding”	 their	possessions)	rather	than	in	public	or	at	work.		
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disentangling	these	two	effects.	Repeating	my	study	using	less-aggregated	data	and	finding	ways	to	isolate	the	influences	of	the	guardianship	and	motivational	forces	on	all	crime	rates	may	produce	results	more	aligned	with	predictions	informed	by	the	theoretical	literature	on	the	economics	of	crime.																				
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Chapter	V:	Conclusion		 This	 study	 added	 to	 the	 body	 of	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 research	 that	examines	the	relationship	between	the	business	cycle	and	crime	by	determining	the	nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 growth	 and	 variability	 of	 income	 and	 the	growth	and	variability	of	crime	rates	 in	Mississippi	over	 the	period	1969	to	2015.	Previous	empirical	 research	has	shown	that	property	crime	rates	 tend	 to	 increase	during	recessions	and	that	violent	crime	rates	tend	to	be	unaffected	by	changes	 in	the	business	cycle.	Results	regarding	the	relationship	between	vehicle	theft	and	the	business	 cycle	 are	 less	 clear,	 potentially	 due	 to	 the	 grouping	 together	 of	 vehicle	thefts	motivated	by	both	financial	and	non-financial	tendencies.		Because	a	large	portion	of	the	effect	of	the	business	cycle	on	crime	is	thought	to	 be	 generated	 by	 the	 changes	 in	 real	 income	 levels	 that	 occur	 throughout	 the	course	of	 the	business	 cycle,	 I	 estimate	 long-run	and	 short-run	 income	elasticities	for	violent	crime,	burglary,	larceny,	and	vehicle	theft.	The	long-run	income	elasticity	estimates	 capture	 the	 effect	 of	 income	 growth	 on	 the	 growth	 of	 crime	 rates.	 The	short-run	income	elasticity	estimates	capture	the	effect	of	income	variability	on	the	variability	 of	 crime	 rates.	 I	 also	 estimate	 the	 effect	 of	 non-income	 factors	 of	recessions	on	each	of	these	crime	rates.	My	results	indicate	that	the	long-run	income	elasticities	 of	 burglary	 and	 larceny	 are	 both	 negative	 and	 near	 unit	 elastic.	 In	 the	short	 run,	 the	 income	 elasticity	 of	 larceny	 is	 also	 negative,	 and	 there	 is	 a	 small,	
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positive	effect	of	non-income	recession	characteristics	on	burglary	in	the	short	run.	Besides	 the	 long-run	 coefficient	 on	 larceny,	 no	 other	 estimate	 is	 statistically	significant.	I	discuss	possible	explanations	for	this.	While	the	non-income	effect	of	recessions	on	crime	rates	is	not	fully	clear,	in	general	my	results	support	the	theory	that	income	and	property	crimes	rates	other	than	vehicle	 theft	 are	 countercyclical	 in	Mississippi.	 I	motivated	 these	 conclusions	using	 a	 model	 of	 utility	 and	 expected	 utility	 of	 wealth	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 an	increase	 in	an	 individual’s	wealth	will	decrease	her	propensity	 to	commit	a	crime.	To	do	so,	I	have	shown	that	an	increase	in	income	will	lead	to	a	greater	increase	in	her	utility	of	wealth	than	it	will	her	expected	utility	of	wealth.	If	this	model	can	be	generalized	 for	all	 individuals,	 then	aggregate	 increases	 in	wealth	should	 result	 in	lower	aggregate	crime	rates.		Whether	this	individual	model	can	be	generalized	to	a	more	aggregate	level,	however,	is	not	clear.	Only	some	of	my	results	mimic	the	results	expected	based	on	the	 individual	model.	To	gain	a	clearer	understanding	of	 the	effect	of	 the	business	cycle	 on	 the	 individual’s	 decision	 to	 commit	 a	 crime,	 my	 long-run	 and	 short-run	tests	should	be	repeated	using	 less-aggregated	data	(ideally,	data	on	an	 individual	level).	 Since	 such	 data	 may	 not	 be	 available,	 my	 conclusions	 could	 also	 be	strengthened	 through	 the	 use	 of	 data	 on	 a	 unit	 that	 is	 still	 aggregated	 but	 more	uniform	 than	 Mississippi,	 such	 as	West	 Virginia.	 Methodological	 innovations	 that	isolate	 the	 individual	 effects	 of	 the	 two	key	 forces	 at	play	 (the	 “motivational”	 and	“guardianship”	effects)	may	also	clarify	the	relationship	between	the	business	cycle	and	crime.		
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As	 crime	 is	 such	 a	 relevant	 issue,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 discuss	 any	 policy	implications	 my	 research	 may	 have.	 One	 issue	 to	 note	 is	 the	 need	 for	 greater	awareness	of	the	relationship	between	each	crime	and	the	business	cycle.	Since	this	and	other	 empirical	 studies	 show	 that	 recessions	 tend	 to	 generate	higher	 rates	of	larceny	in	the	short	run,	more	resources	should	be	dedicated	to	inhibiting	this	effect.	This,	of	course,	may	be	difficult	since	recessions	tend	to	also	cause	fewer	resources	to	be	available	to	law	enforcement.	Additionally,	it	is	important	for	policy-makers	to	be	 aware	 that	 recessions	 do	 not	 necessarily	 generate	 changes	 in	 crime	 rates	 via	lowered	 income	 alone.	 Other	 factors,	 such	 as	 unemployment,	may	 play	 a	 part.	 In	particular,	my	 short-run	 results	 show	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 burglary	 and	non-income	recession	characteristics	is	positive.	Efforts	to	address	increases	in	the	burglary	rate	during	recessions	should	be	crafted	with	this	in	mind.	Although	 this	 study	 can	 be	 improved	 with	 better	 data	 and	 more	 precise	methodology,	 it	 is	 able	 to	 supplement	 the	 existing	 literature	 by	 showing	 that	 the	long-run	 income	elasticities	 of	 both	burglary	 and	 larceny	 are	 slightly	 less	 than	 -1,	which	shows	that	these	two	crime	rates	decrease	almost	proportionally	to	increases	in	 income.	 This	 study	 also	 presented	 a	 mathematical	 proof	 showing	 that	 an	individual’s	propensity	to	commit	crime	decreases	as	wealth	increases.	There	is	still	more	to	say	on	this	issue,	and	those	interested	in	expanding	on	this	line	of	research	may	 want	 to	 do	 so	 by	 making	 the	 data	 adjustments	 mentioned	 previously.	Researchers	could	also	examine	how	unemployment	itself,	rather	than	the	catch-all	variable	of	Recession,	affects	crime.	Additionally,	as	is	noted	in	the	literature	review,	not	 all	 researchers	 exclusively	 categorize	 robbery	 as	 a	 violent	 crime.	 Thus,	 one	
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option	may	be	treat	robbery	as	separate	dependent	variable,	rather	than	as	a	part	of	violent	crime.																						
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